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Bank Mergers and the Dynamics of Deposit Interest Rates 






Despite extensive research interest in the last decade, the banking literature has not reached a 
consensus on the impact of bank mergers on deposit rates. In particular, results on the dynamics 
of deposit rates surrounding bank mergers vary substantially across studies. In this paper, we aim 
for a comprehensive empirical analysis of a bank merger’s impact on deposit rate dynamics. We 
base the analysis on a unique dataset comprising deposit rates of 624 US banks with a monthly 
frequency for the time period 1997–2006. These data are matched with individual bank and local 
market characteristics and the complete list of bank mergers in the US. The data allow us to track 
the dynamics of bank mergers while controlling for the rigidity of the deposit rates and for a 
range of merger, bank, and local market features. An innovation of our work is the introduction of 
an econometric approach for estimating the change of the deposit rates given their rigidity. 
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JEL code: G21, L111.  Introduction 
Bank mergers affect bank competition by altering the market structure in affected markets and the 
size and geographical scope of the merging banks. Widespread bank consolidation in the US has 
motivated a growing literature on the impact of bank mergers on bank competition. A substantial 
portion of this literature focuses on the impact of bank mergers on bank loan and deposit rates.  
Berger and Hannan (1989) were the first to show in a static framework that high market 
concentration results in lower deposit rates. In a later work, Hannan and Prager (1998) explicitly 
concentrate on bank mergers as a determinant of local bank market concentration and study the 
dynamics of deposit rates during the first year after a bank merger. They document a negative 
impact of mergers on deposit rates. On the other hand, Focarelli and Panetta (2003) find the 
opposite when they extend the time of analysis. They argue that whereas the market power effect 
of a merger materializes soon after the merger, potential efficiency gains can materialize only 
after a delay. These authors extend the time horizon of the analysis to six years after the merger, 
and their results imply that in the long run, merging banks offer higher deposit rates than their 
rivals.  
The seemingly contradicting results of these studies motivate us to revisit the topic. In this paper 
we present a comprehensive analysis of the impact of bank mergers on deposit rate dynamics. 
Our focus is on the effect of the merger on the bank price-setting mechanism, rather than on its 
effect on efficiency and other performance measures.  
We base our analysis on a new, unique dataset, which comprises monthly deposit rate data for 
624 banks in the period 1997-2006. The deposit rate data are matched with bank and market 
characteristics and a complete list of bank mergers from 1988 to 2005. Our dataset allows us to address two important lacunae of the existing literature. First, the 
empirical literature on deposit rate dynamics around bank mergers has so far ignored the rigidity 
of deposit rates. As documented in earlier studies (Hannan and Berger, 1991; and Neumark and 
Sharpe, 1992) deposit rates adjust sluggishly to changes in market interest rates. Deposit rate 
rigidity is relevant for the analysis of the changes of deposit rates around bank mergers because 
no immediate change in deposit rates is observed for a significant number of observations. In 
addition to a possibly slow adjustment to the change in market structure, which must be modelled 
with a dynamic model, the data present the additional problem of censoring: that is, for the vast 
majority of observations, the price is the same as for the period before. In econometric terms this 
censoring presents large potential problems. It has long been known that in the presence of 
censoring, OLS regression results can be inconsistent and biased (see a standard text such as 
Wooldridge, 2002).  
We incorporate the rigidity of deposit rates in the empirical analysis by explicitly integrating the 
censoring process into the empirical estimation. For this purpose, we estimate a model of deposit 
rate changes which considers both the probability of a deposit rate change and the magnitude of 
the change. The construction of the model heavily borrows from the (S,s) literature, which 
assumes a lumpy cost of price adjustment in the analysis of firm price-setting behaviour
1. The 
application of this approach to model the price-setting mechanism in the banking industry is a 
major innovation of this study.   
Second, previous research on the impact of bank mergers has mostly concentrated on in-market 
mergers. We argue that the distinction between in- and out-of-market mergers is not clear-cut 
since modern bank mergers might be classified as both in- and out-of-market depending on the 
                                                 
1 See Sheshinski and Weiss (1977), Caplin and Spulberg (1987), Cabalero and Engels (2007) 
  2perspective of the local market. We include all bank mergers (without ex ante imposing 
restrictions on the type of merger) together with a range of controls for the characteristics of the 
mergers. Thus, we are able to assess the impact of a wide range of bank mergers and how this 
impact may be modified by various features of the merger (bank size growth, market share 
growth, or rise in the number of markets). In other words, we estimate whether bank mergers 
exert negative impacts on depositors and if that is the case, which features of the merger reinforce 
the negative impact. 
The results of our study uncover a significant negative impact of bank mergers on checking 
account rates, both in the short and in the long run. These results are consistent with Hannan and 
Prager’s (1998) finding of a drop in deposit rates after bank mergers. Contrary to Focarelli and 
Panetta (2003), we show that this negative effect is not exhausted in the first year after the 
merger. The negative effect of bank mergers on deposit rates is mainly driven by the change in 
the local market share of the merging banks. In other words, the post-merger dynamics of deposit 
rates seems to be mainly driven by the in-market dimension of the merger. The out-of-market 
dimension’s impact on deposit rates turns out to be much smaller than the effect of the in-market 
dimension. Having said this, we should mention that we were able to document a negative impact 
of bank mergers only on checking account rates. Our analysis of the dynamics of money market 
account rates, which, being an investment product, are associated with lower switching costs, 
show no persistent change around bank mergers.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the existing literature. 
Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents replications of earlier research approaches using 
our new dataset. Section 5 presents our empirical approach and its results.  Section 6 makes some 
concluding remarks.  
  32. Literature  
Our study aims to contribute to a broad empirical literature on the pricing effects of mergers. 
Many studies exist on the impact of company mergers in various industries
2, but because of 
better data availability, most of the research deals with the banking industry. Most of the 
literature on the impact of bank mergers focuses on testing the validity of two hypotheses, the 
“efficiency hypothesis” and its opposite, the “structure-conduct-performance hypothesis”. The 
“efficiency hypothesis” states that the merged bank might realize economies of scale and other 
efficiency gains and transfer these to the customers in the form of more beneficial interest rates. 
The most important assumption made by the proponents of the efficiency hypothesis is that 
efficiency gains are passed on to consumers rather than to other stakeholders. The “structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis”, on the other hand, states that the merged bank may exploit its 
increased market power and impose interest rates that are disadvantageous to consumers.  
                                                
The seminal paper by Berger and Hannan (1989), which emphasizes the structure-conduct-
performance hypothesis, is a static study of the relationship between local banking market 
concentration and deposit rates. Here, the authors find that more concentrated deposit markets are 
characterized by lower deposit rates
3. The later work by Hannan and Prager (1998) examines 
bank mergers as a determinant of bank market concentration. The authors explore the dynamics 
of the deposit rate changes
4 and find that after a substantial in-market merger, the merging banks 
significantly decrease their deposit rates, which they explain by an increase in market power.  
 
2 In a study that inspired the early research on the effect of mergers, Kim and Singal (1993) find that airline mergers 
have resulted in higher airfares. However, Connor et al. (1997) find that hospital mergers have resulted in lower 
consumer prices. 
3 Corvoisier and Gropp (2002) replicate Berger and Hannan’s (1989) analysis on a sample of EU banks. 
4 Kahn et al. (2005) study the dynamics of loan rates in a similar framework. 
  4Focarelli and Panetta (2003) argue for the efficiency view, maintaining that the post-merger 
period examined in previous studies is too short
5. They argue that the effect of market power 
materializes instantaneously, while efficiency gains need more time to materialize
6. They present 
a more comprehensive study, which incorporates long-run post-merger dynamics and controls for 
bank size and asset risk with total assets and bad loans, and for the market. In their study, 
efficiency gains prevail. Whereas merging banks tend to decrease deposit rates in the transition 
period (up to three years after the merger), in the long-run, deposit rates of merged banks go up 
and beyond those of rival banks.  
The studies mentioned above focus mostly on in-market mergers, occasionally using out-of-
market mergers as a control for mergers that do not increase market power. A newer strand of the 
literature suggests that although out-of-market mergers do not directly affect the distribution of 
market shares, they can significantly impact bank pricing behavior. The theoretical foundation, as 
given by the models of Barros (1999) and Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming), is based on the 
assumption that multimarket banks (which are a result of out-of-market mergers) have access to 
more diverse sources of financing, whereas single-market banks depend largely on retail 
deposits
7. As a result, they argue, out-of-market mergers lead to lower deposit rates. Park and 
Pennacchi (forthcoming)
8 and Hannan and Prager (2006) present empirical tests of this 
hypothesis, and both find that multimarket banks offer lower deposit rates than their single-
market rivals. Using a separate dataset and estimation approach, Rosen (2003), however, finds 
                                                 
5 Sapienza (2002) studies loan rate dynamics in a similar framework. 
6 Berger, Sounders, Scalise and Udell (1998), and Calomiris and Karceski (2000) argue that the gestation period 
needed to restructure a merged bank is three years. 
7 The structure of bank liabilities has been the subject also of a growing literature on market discipline. It has argued 
that banks may not refinance in the wholesale market because wholesale exposures are not insured and create 
incentives for the lenders to monitor. Therefore, banks which are perceived as riskier may prefer to refinance mostly 
with insured retail deposits (Billett, et al., 1998). 
8 Park and Pennacchi use bank size as a proxy for geographical scope. 
  5different results. He argues that growing banks tend to offer higher interest rates on deposits, and 
moreover, a market with more and larger multimarket banks generally sees higher deposit rates at 
all banks.  
The literature of multimarket banking is closely related to that strand of research that investigates 
the interaction between bank size and the way banks compete. In a seminal paper, Stein (2002) 
argues that large and small banks process information differently and that is why they compete 
differently in the loan market. Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) extend this argument and argue 
that bank size is also important for deposit market competition.  
The literature on multimarket banks is also related to literature on industrial organisation that 
investigates multiple contacts between firms as a factor facilitating collusion. Edwards (1955) 
points to the fact that when firms meet in numerous markets they may have higher incentives to 
collude because retaliation by rivals may follow in so many markets. This relation is known as 
the “linked oligopoly” hypothesis. Mester (1987) provides an empirical test of this hypothesis and 
finds that, contrary to expectations, multiple market contacts lead to more competitive pricing, 
especially in concentrated markets.  
In this paper we focus on the seemingly contradictory results with regard to deposit rate 
dynamics. One potential reason for the deviating results is that researchers have used different 
datasets. Results might also be biased because of the inadequate treatment of deposit rate 
dynamics (in particular, the time series structure of deposit rates has been ignored). Moreover, all 
existing studies include only a fraction of past mergers in the analysis. We add to the literature by 
performing a comprehensive analysis, which addresses both the dynamics of deposit rates and a 
broad range of features of bank mergers with a single dataset, allowing us to control for pre- and 
post-merger characteristics of the local markets. 
  63. Data 
We base the empirical estimation on a unique dataset that is drawn from the full list of bank 
mergers in the US for the time period 1988-2005, from the Supervisory Master File of Bank 
Mergers and Acquisitions. For each bank we construct a list of its six most recent mergers. We 
match this data with Bankrate Monitor’s deposit rates of 624 US banks operating in 164 local 
markets (a total of 1,738 bank-market groups) for the period starting September 19, 1997, and 
ending July 21, 2006
9. Radecki (1998) presents evidence that multimarket banks tend to offer 
uniform rates across local markets. However, in our sample we observe banks that offer different 
rates in different local markets. Therefore, we prefer to keep the bank-market as the observation 
unit. By doing this, we can control for both bank and local market characteristics in the analysis. 
Bankrate Monitor’s deposit rate data have weekly frequency. But using weekly deposit rate 
changes as a proxy for deposit rate setting after a merger introduces a lot of noise. Therefore, as 
in Kahn et al. (2005), we base our tests on rate changes computed over four-week intervals. Our 
sample encompasses a total of 461 weeks, which allows us to construct a time series of 115 four-
week intervals, which we refer to as “months” although they do not correspond to calendar 
months. This approach also allows the comparison of our results with those of Hannan and Prager 
(1998), which are also based on data with a monthly frequency.  
Bankrate Monitor reports cover a comprehensive set of deposit products (checking accounts, 
money market deposit accounts, and certificates of deposits with a maturity of three months to up 
to five years). In this paper we concentrate on checking account and money market deposit 
account (MMDA) rates only. We exclude the rates on certificates of deposit because they are 
                                                 
9 Our merger data start roughly 10 years before the start of our deposit rate dataset. This is motivated by the fact that 
we need data about past mergers in order to examine both the short-term and the long-term effects of bank mergers 
on deposit rates.  
  7investment products with a relatively high minimum denomination, and we expect them to react 
less to changes in local market conditions.
10 As noted by Örs and Rice (2007), Bankrate Monitor 
reports give deposit rates for “the lowest minimum deposit amount,” which might be the 
“effectively lowest rates offered by banks and not the most-commonly cited rates”. Although a 
downward bias in the Bankrate Monitor deposit rate data is possible, if this bias is persistent, it is 
unlikely to affect our results, since we concentrate on deposit rate changes around the merger 
rather than on deposit rate levels.     
In addition, we enrich the dataset with a broad range of control variables for individual banks 
from the Quarterly Reports of Conditions and Income (call reports). These are at a quarterly 
frequency. We also include control variables for the local markets. The source of the local market 
controls is the Summary of Deposits, and these data are available only at an annual frequency. 
4.  Mergers and deposit rate dynamics: a simple empirical framework 
As pointed out in Section 2, previous studies have reached contradictory results on the impact of 
bank mergers on deposit rates. Results may differ because of different estimation approaches but 
also because researchers have employed different data sources. Hannan and Prager (1998), for 
example, employ data from US bank mergers, whereas Focarelli and Panetta (2003) base their 
analysis on Italian data. In order to illustrate how sensitive the empirical results are to the changes 
of the model specification, we start the empirical analysis by replicating Hannan and Prager’s and 
Focarelli and Panetta’s estimation approaches with our dataset.  
                                                 
10 Hannan and Prager (1998) find no significant impact of bank mergers on certificate of deposit rates. 
  8Our first exercise is to apply Hannan and Prager’s (1998) estimation approach to our dataset. For 
the sake of comparability, we concentrate in this section on substantial in-market mergers only
11. 
As in Hannan and Prager (1998), we estimate the following empirical model by a panel OLS with 
robust standard errors methodology
12:  
t j i t i ijt ijt dummies merger deprate deprate , , , 1 0 1 _ ln ln ξ α α + + = − − .    (1) 
The dependant variable,  1 ln ln − − ijt ijt deprate deprate , is the change in the log of the deposit rate 
(for checking accounts and money market deposit accounts) between t-1 and t. The variable 
 denotes vectors of dummy variables, which measure the amount of time 
relative to the latest merger of bank i. We adopt five time dummies here: 26 to 1 weeks pre-
merger, 0 to 12 weeks post-merger, 13 to 26 weeks post-merger, 27 to 39 weeks post-merger and 
40 to 52 weeks post-merger.  The dummies take the value of 1 if a bank has experienced a merger 
within the respective time window and 0 otherwise.
t i dummies merger , _
13 
As illustrated in Table 1 for both checking account and MMDA rates, we are able to qualitatively 
replicate the results of Hannan and Prager (1998). The time dummy for 13 to 26 weeks post-
merger enters the checking account rate regression with a negative, statistically significant 
coefficient. All other “time-to-merger” dummies are statistically insignificant. In the case of 
money market deposit account rates, the pre-merger effect and the merger effect 13 to 26 weeks 
after the merger are negative and statistically significant, whereas the 27 to 39 weeks after the 
merger effect is positive. The cumulative effect is, however, negative.  These results confirm the 
                                                 
11 As in Hannan and Prager (1998), we concentrate on substantial in-market mergers defined as mergers which led to 
a rise in the local market’s HHI of at least 100 basis points.   
12 As argued by Hannan and Prager (1998), because the dependent variable is first differenced, fixed effects are not 
needed in the estimation. 
13 Our approach is slightly different from Hannan and Prager’s here. They adopt a dummy variable for each of the -
12/+12 months around the merger. 
  9negative short-term effect of in-market mergers
14 on deposit rates and can be interpreted as 
evidence in support of the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis.  
Table 1: Short-term effects of in-market bank mergers 
26 to 1 week pre-merger 0,005 -0,008 **
0,003 0,004
0 to 12 weeks post-merger -0,001 0,000
0,004 0,004
13 to 26 weeks post-merger -0,006 ** -0,010 **
0,003 0,004
27 to 39 weeks post-merger 0,001 0,014 ***
0,003 0,004
40 to 52 weeks post-merger 0,001 -0,002
0,003 0,004









Note: The dependant variable is the monthly change in the log of the deposit rate. The model is estimated by panel 
OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Coefficients in bold, standard errors below coefficients. *, **, 
*** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
In Hannan and Prager’s (1998) framework the change of deposit rates around a merger is studied 
without controlling for changes in the reference interest rates (T-bills or fed funds), which are 
important determinants of deposit rates. One potential approach to control for the reference rate is 
suggested by Focarelli and Panetta (2003). These authors examine the level of deposit rates 
relative to the reference rate rather than just the change of deposit rates
15. They also expand the 
time period analyzed after the merger and include a few controls on the bank and local market 
levels. The estimated model in this case is: 
                                                 
14 In these regression specifications we follow Hannan and Prager (1998) and do not control for any features of the 
bank or the local market. 
15 Note that by using the relative rate as a dependent variable, a coefficient of -1 on the reference rate, which 
corresponds to a perfect adjustment of deposit rates to reference rates, is assumed. This is a strong assumption given 
the rigidity of deposit rates. 
  10t j i t i t j i Controls dummies merger rate relative , , 2 , 1 0 , , _ _ ν γ γ γ + + + = .    (2) 
As in Focarelli and Panetta (2003) the model is estimated using panel OLS with 
heteroskedasticity-robust  standard errors. The dependant variable,  , is the 
difference between the deposit rate (checking account rate or MMDA rate) and the fed funds rate. 
The time distance to the merger is measured by a set of five dummies (for the first, second, third, 
fourth, and fifth year after the merger). Controls for bank characteristics are bank size (log of 
total assets) and bank size squared. On the local market level we control for market concentration 
using the Herfindahl index (HHI) and average per capita income in the local market (in log 
form)
t j i rate relative , , _
16.  
As shown by the results of the estimations of model (2) presented in  
 
Table 2, we are able to qualitatively replicate Focarelli and Pannetta’s (2003) results. Using 
Focarelli and Panetta’s approach, we also document that bank mergers have a positive effect on 
deposit rates. Our results, however, differ from Focarrelli and Panetta’s results, in that we do not 
document a negative short-term impact on deposit rates (that is, in the first two years after the 
merger). The control variables enter the regression with coefficients of the expected sign, given a 
Focarelli and Panetta world. So, larger banks offer lower deposit rates, but the negative effect of 
bank size is exhausted at a certain threshold. The Herfindahl index has a negative and statistically 
ignificant coefficient, suggesting that banks offer lower deposit rates in more concentrated local 
arkets. 




16 Our set of control variables slightly differs from Focarelli and Panetta’s in that we include the squared bank size 
term (significant in all regression specifications) in addition to bank size to control for nonlinearity in the size’s 
impact on deposit rates. The Herfindahl index (HHI) is included as a market structure proxy instead of the 
concentration ratio used by Focarelli and Panetta (2003).  
  11 
 
Table 2: Long-term effect of bank mergers 
1st year after the merger 0,095 ** 0,082 **
0,041 0,035
2nd year after the merger 0,099 ** 0,134 ***
0,045 0,039
3rd year after the merger 0,718 *** 0,705 ***
0,049 0,042
4th year after the merger 0,881 *** 0,768 ***
0,051 0,044
5th year after the merger 0,968 *** 0,743 ***
0,055 0,048
size -4,395 *** -3,083 ***
0,123 0,104
size squared 0,154 *** 0,107 ***
0,004 0,003
market share -1,808 *** -1,002 ***
0,191 0,163
HHI -0,391 * -0,819 ***
0,201 0,174
income 0,000 *** 0,000 ***
0,000 0,000






money market deposit 
account rate
 
Note: The dependant variable is the difference between the deposit rate (money market rate or checking account rate) 
and the fed funds rate. panel OLS with heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors. Coefficients in bold, standard errors 
The results of this exercise differ substantially from those of Hannan and Prager (1998). 
the choice of the dependent variable might also affect the results. In order to better understand 
below coefficients. *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.  
Obviously, Focarelli and Panetta’s approach deviates from Hannan and Prager’s in more ways 
than the choice of the time horizon after the merger. Both the inclusion of control variables and 
what drives the empirical results, we have estimated numerous alternative models, which 
bine different specifications of Hannan and Prager’s (1998) and Focarelli and Panetta’s  com
  12(2003) approaches. The results of these estimations are available from the authors’ website.
17 So, 
for example, including a standard set of control variables turns the negative effect of mergers 
documented in Hannan and Prager (1998) into a positive one even in the short run. When, in 
addition to adding control variables, we also change the dependent variable from the deposit rate 
change (as in Hannan and Prager) to the relative rate (as in Focarelli and Panetta) we find a 
negative merger effect if we examine only one year after the merger and a positive one if we 
examine a period of up to five years after. A comparison of the results illustrates that even when 
the same dataset is employed, empirical results change substantially depending on the choice of 
dependent variable, the time span, and the set of control variables. This conclusion leads us to 
e months, whereas 
money market account rates do not change in more than 84% of the months.  
Table 3: Frequency of positive and negative monthly deposit rate changes 
%
track the dynamics of deposit rate changes in a more comprehensive framework.  
5.  Bank mergers and the dynamics of deposit interest rates: an extended empirical analysis 
The empirical tests presented in Section 4 do not consider the censoring issue arising from the 
rigidity of deposit rates. When we replicate Hannan and Prager’s (1998) approach, we estimate a 
regression in which the dependent variable is the monthly change of deposit rates. As illustrated 
in Table 3, we observe no change in the deposit rate for a huge share of observations in our 
sample. On average, checking account rates stay unchanged in 90% of th





positive change 4 5 %2 %5
negative change 38% 8% 11%
no change 16% 90% 84%  
                                                 
17 http://www.iiw.uni-bonn.de/dinger/ 
  13The dependent variable,  1 ln ln − − ijt ijt deprate deprate , is equal to 0 for these “no change” 
observations  In .  econometric terms, this implies that observed values of the dependent variable 
In this section we present an estimation methodology that accounts for the censoring and thus 
incorporates deposit rate rigidity. We employ the following baseline empirical model: 
are severely censored. As a result of the censoring, OLS estimates can be biased and 
inconsistent
18.  
ijt t jt it it ijt ijt fedfund Controls Controls splines merger deprate deprate ε β β β β β + Δ + + + + = − − 4 3 2 1 0 1 _ ln ln , (3)   




e bank and the local bank market. Thus, when we discuss a negative or 
positive impact of a merger on deposit rates, we mean the impact of the merger on this process. 
                                                
where  ijt deprate  is the deposit rate (checking a te or m et deposit account rate) 
offered by bank i in market j in “month” t,  it splines merger_  is a vector o plines
19 for 
different time distances from the merger.  it Controls  and  jt Controls are vectors 
variables on the individual bank level and the local market, respectively .  fedfund Δ  is a vector 
of the change in the fed funds rate during the periods: (t–1,t), (t–2, t–1) and (t–3, t–2).  
Our model therefore estimates how the process of adjustment—of bank deposit rates to changes 
in the reference rate during the current and previous periods—is modified by bank mergers an
20
the characteristics of th
Estimation technique 
 
18 Although less obvious, the censoring problem is also present in Focarelli and Pannetta’s (2003) framework, where 
the difference between the deposit and the interbank rates is used as a dependent variable. Again, since deposit rates 
change very infrequently, the changes of the dependent variable are driven only by changes in the interbank rate. 
19 The derivation of the spline values will be discussed in detail in the next section. 
20 Our dependent variable data are monthly, whereas some of the bank and local market-level controls are quarterly 
or annual. To deal with this issue we estimate the model using clustered standard errors.  
  14As a benchmark, we first estimate the model by standard OLS. We then proceed to model the 
rigidity of deposit rates and to estimate the impact of bank mergers on deposit rates with a 
“trigger model,” with fixed costs of the price (deposit rate) adjustment constructed in the tradition 
of the (S,s) literature
21. In this literature, the optimizing agent must pay a fixed cost for adjusting 
its price.  Faced with this decision, and a set of simplifying assumptions, the agent will act 
according to a simple decision rule involving a change that would be desired by the bank in the 
absence of fixed costs and a threshold level.  The bank does not change its price until the 
In other words, we assume that an underlying latent variable, itself a function of measured time 
series characteristics, must reach a positive or a negative trigger point before the deposit rate can 
change in either direction.  
The desired deposit rate adjustment, in the absence of a fixed cost, is  . We rewrite 
,          )  
where 
difference between the current price and the desired price exceeds the threshold, whereupon the 
bank changes the price to the desired level.  
* ln ijt deprate Δ
equation (3) as a desired level of adjustment,  
( 4 ijt ijt ijt X deprate ε β + = Δ
* ln
β ijt X  denotes vectors of the explanatory variables of equation (3), 
t jt it it ijt fedfund Controls Controls splines merger X Δ + + + ≡ 4 3 2 _ + 1 0 β β β β β β , and   is the error 
                                                
ijt
term, as before. 
u
 
21 (S,s) models were first introduced to model retail inventories, where inventory levels had to fall below a threshold 
value, “s”, before the firm would order new production. In the last two decades they have been extensively used to 
model lumpy price adjustments (Sheshinski and Weiss, 1977; Cabalero and Engels, 2007).  
  15The idea behind what we observe in the deposit rate (as opposed to what is actually desired by the 
the bank has a fixed cost of adjusting the nominal deposit rate; this fixed cost may 
vary depending on the measured and unmeasured characteristics of the bank, and until the 
ijt deprate ln  (without the star) denotes the observed deposit rate change.  It is a function of the 
desired deposit rate change, 
* ln ijt deprate Δ , which must exceed a threshold (the trig
bank) is that 
difference between the desired and the current rate is large enough, the bank does not change its 
nominal rate. As in the classic (S,s) model, we model the deposit rate process such that 
ger point) for 
an actual change to occur.  Note that in our framework the absolute values of the upper and lower 
threshold can be different. This is to allow for the possibility that banks are less likely to adjust 
their deposit rates upward than downward
22. For example, we hange 
unless the desired change plus a random error term exceeds an upper threshold, cu: 
, if        
, otherwise. 
 otherwise, because the fixed costs of 
changing do not make it worth the possible benefits of adjustment. Here the functions cl and cu 
Δ
 do not observe a positive c
* ln ln ijt ijt deprate deprate Δ = Δ u ijt ijt c u deprate > + Δ
* ln
* ln ln ijt ijt deprate deprate Δ = Δ , if  l ijt ijt c u deprate < + Δ
* ln     (5) 
The first part of equation (5) represents the change if the “desired change” exceeds the upper 
threshold, the second part gives the change if the desired change is less than the lower threshold, 
and the third part simply says that no change is observed
0 ln = Δ ijt deprate
represent the trigger points of the (S,s) rule (where  u l c c < < 0 ) and are estimated from the data. 
                                                 
22 Neumark and Sharpe (1992) and Berger and Hannan (1991) show that deposit rates are especially inflexible when 
the pressure is to adjust upward.  
  16They are functions of the same control variables as those used in equation (3).  The term  ijt u  
represents an error term associated with the trigger points.  
ordinary least squares estimation of equation (5), which uses only those observation  the 
bank changed its price, is inconsistent.  Thi
While this structure is fairly straightforward econometrically, it is worth noting that the sim
s where
s can be seen by calculating the bias term, which we 
use later in forming a consistent estimate.  If the errors are assumed to be normally distributed, 
that is, 
ple 
) , 0 ( ~ 1 σ ε N ijt and ) , 0 ( ~ 2 σ N uijt , then calculating the expectation of the observed 
e expectation, given the control variables,  , and the 
fact that the observed change is not zero is  
deposit rate change is straightforward. Th ijt X
) 0 ln , ln (
) 0 ln , ln ( ) 0 ln , ln (
> Δ Δ +
< Δ Δ = ≠ Δ Δ
ijt ijt ijt l
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  17Although the likelihood functions for the system described above are well defined, maximum 
likelihood estimation proce d because of the large numbers of parameters, 
different approach based on the work of Heckman (1976, 1979).  
e
problem with a bias term, 
dures rarely converge
combined with the huge number of observations. However, the form of the equation suggests a 
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mal cumulative and density functions, νu and νl, which we estimate in a first 
stage.  Then we form a variable 
 of it.  The idea is that we 
first estimate what this term is, up to the linear parameter, σ, and then include it in a linear least 





















, which we include as a linear argument in a 
second stage. By including this estimated bias term, our estimated variable β will be consistent.  
ameter σ. 
So, in the first step, we estimate 

















=  using two separate probits 
 
on whether or not we observe price increases or decreases and compute  









  .       ( 1 0 )  
The intuition of λ  is that it represents the expectation of the error term due to the censoring 
process. The parameters β  are estimated in the second step using simple GLS on the 
observations of the changes in the deposit rate that are nonzero:  
  18) , ( ˆ ) 0 ln , ln ( l ijt ijt ijt ijt v v X deprate X deprate E λ σ β + = ≠ Δ Δ .   (11)    u
By including an estimated value of λ  as a right-hand variable in a second stage, we ensure that 
the unobserved error term has an expectation that approaches zero in large samples, giving us 
consistent estimates of our parameters of interest, β . That is, λ  is included as a regressor in the 
estimation of  ijt deprate ln Δ  to correct for the censoring bias. 
Of course, the standard errors for the estimated parameters must be estimated in a way that 
accounts for the fact that an included regressor,  ) , ( u l ν ν λ , is estimated in the first stage. The 
methods we use are standard in the literature. Be tage of the procedure represents an 
rs can be estimated from the stacked 
The empirical approach described above gives us a consistent estimate of the impact of mergers 
ccounting for interest rate rigidity. The estimates illustrate how mergers 
cause each s
M-estimate, in the sense of Huber (1967), standard erro
system in fairly standard ways, described in Wooldridge (2002). Finally, the trigger functions,  l c  
and  u c , can, in principle, be easily recovered from the probit estimates of the first stage, along 
with the estimated parameters of the second stage.  
on deposit rates while a
affect bank price setting and, in particular, how a bank’s reaction to a change in the reference rate 
is modified by a merger.  
Explanatory variables 
We include three sets of explanatory variables: those that measure a merger’s impact across time, 
those that control for the type of merger, and general bank and market level control variables.  
Variables measuring merger’s impact across time and  
  19When defining the impact of a bank merger on deposit rates, we concentrate on two major issues, 
the evolution of the effect of a bank merger over time; and the question of how many of a given 
umber of subintervals, and within each of the subintervals the function is linearly 
across the subintervals.  The end points of the linearly approximated subintervals are known as 
“knots”.  
Algebraically, each spline is a linear function constructed as: 
bank’s previous mergers should be considered (numerous banks acquire multiple targets within a 
very short period). By concentrating exclusively on the latest merger, we might omit important 
information about the evolution of bank merger effects. 
To consider the evolution of a merger effect, we account for a period from one year before the 
merger date
23 to up to ten years after the merger. We approximate the development of deposit 
rates around the merger by linear spline interpolation, the simplest form of spline interpolation
24.  
It is equivalent to piecewise linear interpolation, where the function to be modelled is divided into 
a fixed n
approximated. Nonlinearity can, therefore, be modeled by different slopes of the linear functions 
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x f α α    when  ], , ( 1 +
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∈ i i x x x     
and where x is the value of the explanatory variable (the time distance to the merger, in our case).  
The values  i x  denote the “knots” of the spline, and the coefficients,  i
             =                 0, otherwise,            (12) 
α , are estimated from the 
data. In our case, we approximate the impact of a merger on the change in deposit rates by 
                                                 
23 The merger date is the date on which the target bank loses its charter.  
24 See Craig and Santos, 1997. 
  20dividing the time period around the merger into several subperiods. We fix the knots,  i x , at six 
months before the merger date, at the merger date, six months, one year, one and one-half years, 
two years, three years, and four years after the merger. Through the splines we model the 
potential nonlinearity of the dependence between deposit rate changes and time after the merger.  
To our knowledge, previous research on the impact of mergers on bank rates has used only 
dummies for different time windows around the merger. A disadvantage of the dummies is that 
they are a stepwise and discontinuous approximation of the merger effect across time. Linear 
o  the trigger model and the OLS regressions with dummies 
ies for earlier mergers as a result of e fact 
during our sample horizon tend to have merged 
numerous times and so are all similar in this regard.  
Variables controlling for the type of merger 
                                                
splines give a more precise approximation by modeling the effect of mergers as a set of 
continuous linear functions.  
As a robustness check, we reran b th
instead of splines; results did not change qualitatively. The results of these estimations are 
presented on the authors’ web site.
25 
With regard to the history of banks that have experienced numerous mergers, we proceed as 
follows: To keep the model parsimonious, we define the splines for the time distance from the 
latest merger only. For previous mergers, we define a set of dummy variables, mergeri, which 
takes the value of 1 if the bank has had at least i mergers and 0, otherwise. Our dataset contains 
up to six mergers for an individual bank. The variables merger4, merger5, and merger6  entered all 
regression specifications with statistically insignificant coefficients, so we dropped them from the 
analysis. We interpret the insignificance of the dumm  th
that banks that have merged three times 
 
25 http://www.iiw.uni-bonn.de/dinger/ 
  21In our study, we include the full sample of bank mergers in the period 1988-2005. We do not 
divide mergers into in-market and out-of-market groups, because we think that this distinction is 
not clear cut. Most of the mergers in the US during the last few years have been between banks 
that were already operating in multiple markets. From one local market’s point of view, a merger 
might appear as an in-market merger (if the local market is part of the overlapping geographical 
range of the two merging banks). In contrast, from the point of view of a local market in which 
only one of the merging banks has been operating, the merger appears as a market extension (out-
of-market) merger. Based on these considerations, we include all mergers in the analysis, together 
with a range of merger characteristics as controls.  
The existing literature has so far emphasized three important features of bank mergers, which 
might influence the pricing behavior of the merged bank, and we include these in our model. The 
first is the change in market share. When two banks operating in the same market merge, their 
joint market share allows them to exercise market power and offer lower deposit rates. We 
control for this effect by including in the regressions the change of market share (CMS) caused 
by the merger. Because we do not have precise data on the change of market share directly 
related to the merger for each of the affected local markets, we have to approximate it with the 
change of market share realized in the year of the merger. That is, we approximate the change of 
market share caused by the merger as the difference between the bank’s market share in the years 
before and after the merger
26.  
In order to estimate how the effect of the change of market share evolves in the time after the 
merger, we also introduce a cross-product of CMS and the time after the merger (CMS*time after 
merger=CMS*ln(1+ weeks after the merger)). 
                                                 
26 Summary of Deposits publishes market shares as of June 30; therefore, we define the year in this case as the period 
July 1 to June  30. 
  22The second key aspect of mergers that has been emphasized in the literature is the change of bank 
size. Because banks grow in size when they merge, they might achieve efficiencies of scale. On 
the other hand, as Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) point out, larger banks have access to more 
diversified sources of financing and might, therefore, keep deposit rates low. To estimate the 
impact of the merged banks’ size (target’s size), we include the volume of total assets of the 
target bank
27 (normalized to the acquirer’s total assets) in the regression. The cross-product of the 
target’s size and the time after the merger (TS*time after merger= target’s size* ln(1+ weeks after 
the merger)) is also included in the regression. 
Finally, as suggested by the linked-oligopoly hypothesis, the number of markets in which a bank 
is active might also significantly affect its pricing behavior. In order to estimate the effect of the 
market-extension dimension of the mergers we include the change of number of local markets 
(CNM) divided by the number of markets prior to the merger as a regressor. As with the CMS, 
we have to approximate the CNM, which we do with the ratio of the number of markets in which 
a bank operates in the years before and after the merger. Again, we include the cross-product of 
the CNM variable and the time after the merger (CNM* ln(1+ weeks after the merger)) as a 
regressor.  
Control variables 
In addition to the merger-related variables and the variables measuring the change of the fed 
funds rate, we include a number of control variables for the merged bank and for the local market. 
For individual banks, these are bank size (measured by the log of total assets), bank size squared, 
and the share of deposits to total assets (lagged one year in order to avoid simultaneity). This 
variable is included as a measure of a bank’s dependence on retail deposits, following the 
                                                 
27 The Supervisory Master File of Bank Mergers and Acquisitions provides data for the target banks’ ID. Given these, 
we match the acquiring banks’ data with the target banks’ data from the Call Report. 
  23argument by Park and Pennacchi (forthcoming) that banks with easier access to wholesale funds 
might compete less aggressively in the retail deposit market. For the local market, we control for 
market concentration (as measured by the Herfindahl index) and per capita income (in log form) 
for the counties in the market.  
Empirical results 
The results of the baseline OLS estimations of changes in checking account rates and money 
market deposit account rates are presented in Tables 3 and 4, respectively. Estimations of the 
trigger model are presented in Table 5 and 6
28.   
A comparison of the results of the OLS and the trigger models indicates that both the economic 
and the statistical significance of the merger’s effect on deposit rate dynamics is stronger when 
we control for the rigidity of deposit rates. The higher statistical significance of the trigger 
estimates can be explained by the fact that the trigger model ignores the noise introduced by the 
“no change” observations. The lower economic significance of the OLS estimates is a direct 
effect of the censoring bias, which is present in the OLS estimation. The economic intuition of 
the difference between the trigger model and the OLS results is that within the trigger model we 
explicitly treat the dynamics of the deposit rates, especially their rigidity. That is, in the presence 
of positive price adjustment costs, the observed path of deposit rate dynamics differs from the 
desired one. In the following discussion we will concentrate on the unbiased trigger model 
results.  
The empirical results on changes in checking account rates point to a negative impact of mergers. 
Whereas the pre-merger effect is insignificant in all checking account rate regression 
                                                 
28 The results of the first-stage of the estimation (the probit regressions on positive or negative deposit rate changes) 
are available from the authors upon request and on the authors’ website (www.iiw.uni-bonn.de/dinger/). 
  24specifications, the immediate effect of the merger is negative and statistically significant. 
Moreover, the merger continues to exert a negative impact on deposit rates up until the beginning 
of the third year after the merger. Only during the third year can we identify a positive impact of 
the merger on deposit rate changes, but this impact is offset by the negative effect during the 
following years. A note is due here that the spline coefficients presented in Tables 3 to 6 do not 
represent the marginal effects but the estimated knots of the splines, which in turn model the 
dynamics of the log change of the deposit rates. These coefficients suggest very high magnitude 
of the estimated changes. Let us, for example, have a look at the marginal checking account rate 
changes estimated from the coefficients in the first column of Table 5. The estimated coefficients 
of the splines suggest a marginal change at six months after the merger of -8.6%. The marginal 
effect at 12 months after the merger is estimated to be -2%, at three years after the merger and 
four years after the merger at 9.6% and -5.5%, respectively
29. One year after the merger its 
cumulative effect on the checking account rates is estimated to be a drop by almost 75%. The 
cumulative effect on the checking account rates four years after the merger is estimated to be a 
87% drop
30.    
All in all, mergers negatively and statistically significantly affect deposit rate adjustments. One 
potential explanation for the positive effect around the third year is the fact that during most of 
our sample period stakeholders have assumed that the “gestation” period needed to restructure a 
merged bank is three years (Berger et al., 1998, and Calomiris and Karceski, 2000). Following 
this assumption, some window dressing around the third year might have taken place.  
                                                 
29 The marginal effects are estimated by computing the exponential of the derivative of the spline function. Ben: 
could you please write the formula here…   
30 Note that we derive the cummulative effects by „adding“ up the marginal effects estimated from the spline knots. 
By doing this we do not attach confidence intervals for the estimated cumulative effects. 
  25Among the merger features we study, only the change in market share (CMS) has both a 
statistically and an economically significant impact. Substantial in-market mergers have a 
stronger negative effect on checking account rates in the affected market. This negative effect 
does, as expected, decrease with time after the merger. This result is consistent with Hannan and 
Prager’s (1998) results, who also document a negative impact of substantial in-market mergers on 
deposit rates. The effect of target size is statistically insignificant. The effect of the change of the 
number of markets (CNM) is negative but only marginally significant statistically. These results 
are interesting in light of the discussion of the importance of out-of-market mergers. Whereas 
most extant studies have ignored these types of mergers, others (e.g. Park and Pennacchi, 
forthcoming; Hannan and Prager, 2006) have argued that out-of-market mergers have a 
substantial negative effect on deposit rates. In this study, when we include all mergers and 
compare them within a uniform framework, we find that out-of-market mergers have only a 
negligible negative effect on deposit rates. That is, the main driving force of the negative effect of 
bank mergers on deposit rates is the in-market rather than the out-of-market dimension of the 
merger.  
  26Table 3: Mergers and checking account rate dynamics: OLS estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
spline-0.5 -0.001 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
spline0 0.023 *** 0.023 0.023 0.023 *** 0.023 ***
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
spline+0.5 0.003 0.001 0.003 0.003 0.002
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
spline+1 0.006 0.004 0.006 0.006 0.004
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
spline+1. 5 -0.011 *** -0.014 *** -0.011 *** -0.011 ** -0.013 ***
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
spline+2 -0.007 * -0.011 *** -0.007 * -0.007 * -0.010 **
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
spline+3 0.002 -0.002 0.002 0.002 -0.001
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
spline+4 -0.012 *** -0.018 *** -0.013 *** -0.012 *** -0.017 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.004
target's size  -0.006 -0.005
0.005 0.005
TS*time after merger 0.005 0.006
0.002 0.002
change market share (CMS) -0.023 -0.013
0.031 0.031
CMS*time after merger 0.005 -0.001
0.009 0.009
change number of markets (CNM) -0.002 -0.001
0.002 0.002
CNM*time after merger 0.000 -0.001
0.001 0.001
merger2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.000
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
merger3 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.004 -0.002
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
change fed fundsrate (t;t-1) 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 *** 0.022 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
change fed fundsrate (t-1;t-2) 0.052 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 *** 0.052 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
change fed fundsrate (t-2;t-3) 0.031 *** 0.032 *** 0.031 *** 0.031 *** 0.032 ***
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
bank size -0.016 *** -0.013 ** -0.017 *** -0.018 *** -0.014 **
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
bank size squared 0.001 *** 0.000 *** 0.001 *** 0.001 *** 0.000 ***
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
deposits to assets 0.001 -0.001 0.000 0.000 -0.001
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
market share -0.006 -0.008 -0.006 -0.006 -0.008
0.007 0.007 0.008 0.007 0.008
HHI -0.005 -0.005 -0.006 -0.006 -0.005
0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.011
income 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
constant 0.096 ** 0.074 * 0.099 ** 0.106 ** 0.075 *
0.044 0.046 0.044 0.045 0.047
number of observations 41440 41440 41440 41440 41440
R-squared 0.0194 0.0195 0.0194 0.0197 0.0198  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  27Table 4: Mergers and money market deposit account rate dynamics: OLS estimates 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
spline-0.5 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005 -0.005
0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007
spline0 -0.003 -0.002 -0.003 -0.003 -0.002
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
spline+0.5 -0.007 -0.008 -0.007 -0.007 -0.007
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
spline+1 0.027 *** 0.026 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 *** 0.027 ***
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
spline+1. 5 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003
0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005 0.005
spline+2 -0.017 *** -0.018 *** -0.017 *** -0.017 *** -0.018 ***
0.004 0.005 0.004 0.005 0.005
spline+3 0.007 0.006 0.007 0.007 0.006
0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.004
spline+4 -0.023 *** -0.025 *** -0.023 *** -0.023 *** -0.025 ***
0.003 0.004 0.003 0.004 0.004
target's size  0.006 0.007
0.005 0.006
TS*time after merger 0.001 0.002
0.002 0.002
change market share (CMS) -0.001 -0.006
0.034 0.035
CMS*time after merger -0.002 -0.003
0.010 0.010
change number of markets (CNM) 0.000 -0.001
0.002 0.002
CNM*time after merger 0.000 0.000
0.001 0.001
merger2 0.000 -0.002 0.000 0.000 -0.001
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
merger3 -0.001 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.000
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
change fed fundsrate (t;t-1) 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 *** 0.021 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
change fed fundsrate (t-1;t-2) 0.073 *** 0.073 *** 0.073 *** 0.073 *** 0.073 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
change fed fundsrate (t-2;t-3) 0.035 *** 0.035 *** 0.035 *** 0.035 *** 0.035 ***
0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003
bank size -0.001 0.002 -0.001 -0.001 0.003
0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006 0.006
bank size squared 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
deposits to assets 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.070 *** 0.071 ***
0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016 0.016
market share 0.014 * 0.012 0.014 * 0.014 * 0.012
0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.008
HHI 0.000 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.001
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
income 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 ** 0.004 **
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.002
constant -0.026 -0.054 -0.027 -0.024 -0.056
0.050 0.052 0.050 0.050 0.053
number of observations 39861 39861 39861 39861 39861
R-squared 0.0261 0.0262 0.0261 0.0261 0.0262  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. 
  28Table 5: Mergers and checking account rate dynamics: results of the “trigger” model  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
spline-0.5 -0.058 -0.054 -0.059 -0.056 -0.056
0.057 0.056 0.057 0.057 0.057
spline0 -0.102 ** -0.110 ** -0.095 ** -0.104 ** -0.102 **
0.046 0.046 0.047 0.046 0.046
spline+0.5 -0.090 ** -0.109 ** -0.090 ** -0.096 ** -0.107 **
0.044 0.045 0.044 0.045 0.045
spline+1 -0.021 -0.030 -0.022 -0.027 -0.033
0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039 0.039
spline+1. 5 -0.102 ** -0.128 *** -0.106 ** -0.098 ** -0.121 ***
0.044 0.044 0.044 0.045 0.045
spline+2 -0.092 ** -0.115 *** -0.098 ** -0.093 ** -0.115 ***
0.041 0.042 0.041 0.042 0.043
spline+3 0.096 *** 0.072 ** 0.088 ** 0.095 *** 0.068 *
0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035 0.035
spline+4 -0.056 ** -0.096 *** -0.064 ** -0.057 * -0.096 ***
0.028 0.031 0.029 0.030 0.032
target's size  -0.034 -0.016
0.030 0.032
TS*time after merger 0.043 *** 0.040 ***
0.013 0.014
change market share (CMS) -0.408 ** -0.378 *
0.195 0.193
CMS*time after merger 0.143 ** 0.103 *
0.061 0.060
change number of markets (CNM) -0.021 * -0.017
0.012 0.013
CNM*time after merger 0.002 0.000
0.005 0.005
merger2 -0.028 -0.026 -0.023 -0.022 -0.019
0.021 0.022 0.021 0.021 0.022
merger3 -0.017 -0.014 -0.019 -0.021 -0.018
0.019 0.020 0.019 0.020 0.020
change fed fundsrate (t;t-1) -0.015 -0.013 -0.014 -0.017 -0.014
0.016 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.015
change fed fundsrate (t-1;t-2) 0.103 *** 0.104 *** 0.103 *** 0.101 *** 0.103 ***
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
change fed fundsrate (t-2;t-3) 0.059 *** 0.061 *** 0.059 *** 0.056 *** 0.058 ***
0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015 0.015
bank size -0.096 ** -0.087 ** -0.105 ** -0.114 *** -0.103 **
0.043 0.043 0.044 0.045 0.044
bank size squared 0.003 ** 0.003 ** 0.003 ** 0.003 *** 0.003 **
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
deposits to assets 0.354 *** 0.350 *** 0.341 *** 0.351 *** 0.338 ***
0.112 0.112 0.112 0.112 0.113
market share 0.057 0.053 0.039 0.064 0.043
0.061 0.061 0.062 0.061 0.062
HHI -0.226 ** -0.229 ** -0.222 ** -0.241 *** -0.235 ***
0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091 0.091
income 0.020 0.020 0.021 0.019 0.019
0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014 0.014
lambda -0.374 *** -0.379 *** -0.367 *** -0.380 *** -0.377 ***
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
constant 0.949 ** 0.886 ** 1.013 *** 1.111 *** 1.015 ***
0.384 0.384 0.390 0.396 0.392
number of observations 41440 41440 41440 41440 41440
censored regression observations 4360 4360 4360 4360 4360
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.09  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively. Table 6: Mergers and money market deposit account rate dynamics: results of the “trigger” model 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
spline-0.5 -0.017 -0.017 -0.017 -0.015 -0.016
0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023 0.023
spline0 0.032 0.031 0.032 0.031 0.033
0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021 0.021
spline+0.5 -0.113 *** -0.113 *** -0.113 *** -0.117 *** -0.116 ***
0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034 0.034
spline+1 0.108 *** 0.101 *** 0.108 *** 0.105 *** 0.099 ***
0.037 0.037 0.037 0.037 0.038
spline+1. 5 0.022 0.023 0.022 0.018 0.021
0.029 0.030 0.029 0.029 0.030
spline+2 -0.102 *** -0.102 *** -0.101 *** -0.105 *** -0.105 ***
0.025 0.028 0.025 0.026 0.029
spline+3 0.092 *** 0.087 *** 0.093 *** 0.089 ** 0.086 **
0.035 0.033 0.035 0.035 0.033
spline+4 -0.076 *** -0.082 *** -0.075 *** -0.081 *** -0.084 ***
0.020 0.023 0.020 0.021 0.024
target's size  0.007 0.018
0.021 0.024
TS*time after merger 0.006 0.004
0.010 0.010
change market share (CMS) 0.100 0.085
0.157 0.157
CMS*time after merger -0.029 -0.029
0.047 0.047
change number of markets (CNM) -0.011 * -0.015 *
0.007 0.008
CNM*time after merger 0.002 0.003
0.003 0.003
merger2 -0.017 -0.019 -0.018 -0.014 -0.018
0.015 0.015 0.014 0.015 0.015
merger3 -0.022 * -0.020 -0.022 * -0.023 * -0.020
0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.013
change fed fundsrate (t;t-1) -0.027 ** -0.026 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 ** -0.027 **
0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012
change fed fundsrate (t-1;t-2) 0.080 *** 0.081 *** 0.080 *** 0.080 *** 0.080 ***
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
change fed fundsrate (t-2;t-3) 0.016 0.017 0.016 0.015 0.016
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
bank size 0.082 *** 0.088 *** 0.084 *** 0.074 ** 0.082 ***
0.028 0.029 0.028 0.029 0.030
bank size squared -0.002 *** -0.003 *** -0.002 *** -0.002 ** -0.002 ***
0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.001
deposits to assets 0.375 *** 0.375 *** 0.378 *** 0.365 *** 0.370 ***
0.069 0.069 0.069 0.069 0.070
market share 0.045 0.045 0.048 0.047 0.047
0.043 0.043 0.044 0.043 0.044
HHI -0.061 -0.059 -0.060 -0.065 -0.062
0.070 0.070 0.071 0.070 0.071
income 0.013 0.013 0.013 0.012 0.013
0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010 0.010
lambda -0.221 *** -0.218 *** -0.221 *** -0.223 *** -0.220 ***
0.019 0.019 0.019 0.018 0.019
constant -0.717 *** -0.774 *** -0.738 *** -0.653 *** -0.727 ***
0.238 0.246 0.239 0.247 0.249
number of observations 39861 39861 39861 39861 39861
censored regression observations 6893 6893 6893 6893 6893
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07  
Note: *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   31
                                                
The statistically insignificant coefficients of the merger2 and merger3 variables indicate that 
earlier mergers do not have a significant impact on checking account rates. The change of the fed 
funds rate during the current month also has no significant impact on the change in checking 
account rates. The change in checking account rates is determined instead by changes in the fed 
funds rate in the previous two months. These results show that checking account rates adjust to 
fed fund rate changes with a substantial delay. The coefficients of the change in fed funds rate 
variables also suggest that the pass-through is incomplete
31.  
Bank size enters the checking account rate regressions with negative significant coefficients, 
indicating that larger banks tend to offer lower deposit rates. This result is consistent with results 
of previous studies (Hannan and Prager, 2004; Park and Pennacchi, forthcoming). The ratio of 
deposits to total assets has a significant positive impact on checking account rates: A bank whose 
primary source of financing is retail deposits will be more likely to increase its deposit rates. 
Market share and the average income of the local market’s population are not significant, but the 
local market concentration (measured by the Herfindahl index) enters the regression with the 
expected negative, significant coefficient. 
When we turn from checking account rates to money market deposit account rates, we cannot 
document a persistent positive or negative impact of mergers. MMDA rates significantly decrease 
about six months after the merger but recover again about a year after the merger. They drop 
again about two years after the merger and significantly increase during the third year. In the 
following years, the effect is negative. Six months after the merger its marginal effect is estimated 
to be a drop of 10.7%. The marginal effect of the merger one, three and four years after its 
completion date are estimated as an increase of 11.3%, an increase of 9.6% and a drop of 7.3%,  
 
31 Gropp et al. (2007) find evidence on incomplete and delayed adjustment of deposit rates offered by European 
banks.   32
                                                
respectively. The cumulative effect one year after the merger is estimated to be a drop of 19% 
and four years after the merger a drop of 2.2%
32. We interpret this dynamic path of MMDA rate 
changes as a result of the post-merger integration of the pricing policies of the merging banks. It 
is unlikely that this pattern is caused by a systematic abuse of market power.  
Among the merger features we examine, only the change in the number of markets enters the 
regression with a statistically significant coefficient. The sign of this coefficient is negative and 
points to a negative impact of geographical expansion on MMDA rates. Target’s size and the 
change in market share have no significant impact on MMDA rates. 
A comparison between the checking account and MMDA rate results shows that mergers mainly 
affect checking account rates. Our interpretation of this result is that because of high switching 
costs, monopoly rents can more easily be extracted from checking account customers. In contrast, 
MMDAs are an investment product with low switching costs, and MMDA customers can easily 
switch to a competitor if their current bank offers relatively low MMDA rates.  
Moreover, the coefficients of our control variables suggest that local market characteristics are 
irrelevant for MMDA rates. These results suggest that competition in the MMDA market is not 
geographically limited to the metropolitan statistical area (MSA). Previous research has already 
argued that the traditional definition of a local bank market as limited to the MSA may not be 
valid nowadays, because telecommunication allows customers to access more distantly located 
banks (Edelstein and Morgan, 2006). Our results show that MMDA rates are indeed generally 
decoupled from local market conditions. Checking account rates, on the contrary, still strongly 
depend on local market concentration and on the changes in the distribution of market shares. 
 
32 Again, we cannot attach a confidential interval to this estimate.   33
                                                
Another interesting difference between MMDA and checking account rates is their dependence 
on bank size. Whereas larger banks tend to keep checking account rates low,
33 they are more 
likely to increase their money market account rates.  It may be that larger banks are associated 
with more sophisticated customers, who can take advantage of the increased competition offered 
in larger geographical markets. 
6.  Conclusion 
This research paper is motivated by the contradictory results of previous studies that have 
examined the impact of mergers on deposit rates. By replicating previous studies with our new, 
comprehensive deposit rate dataset, we are able to show that empirical results are very sensitive 
to the treatment of the time span around a merger and the choice of control variables. This 
observation encourages us to revisit the topic of deposit rate dynamics around bank mergers. For 
this purpose, we employ deposit rate data with monthly frequency. The high-frequency data allow 
a better treatment of the deposit rate dynamics. However, they make an estimation methodology 
which can account for the rigidity of deposit rates necessary.  
When accounting for deposit rate rigidity, we are able to document a significant negative impact 
of mergers on checking account rates. In particular, in-market mergers, which substantially 
increase the market share of the merging bank, tend to cause a substantial drop in checking 
account rates. On the other hand, MMDA rates are not consistently affected after bank mergers. 
Moreover, once we control for bank size, we cannot document a negative impact of out-of-market 
mergers on deposit rates. Our results are consistent with results of earlier studies, which find 
support for the structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (Berger and Hannan, 1989, and Hannan 
and Prager, 1998). Our findings do, however, contradict Focarelli and Panetta’s (2003) results, 
 
33 This result is consistent with the results of Park and Pennacchi’s (forthcoming) study.   34
since we are not able to find any positive long-term effects of the mergers on both types of 
deposit rates. 
A major contribution of our analysis is that we demonstrate the importance of deposit rate 
dynamics. A more comprehensive analysis of the time series structure of deposit rates and their 
reaction to reference rate changes is a scheduled extension of this research paper.    35
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